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or non-bald or both or neither. The only judgments that can be truly made about impossible objects are negative. We may then qualify Mr. Bradley's doctrine that reality is the subject of every judgment by saying that the subject of every judgment whose copula is affirmative is real. This means, however, that existence is in itself neither a predicate, as Anselm seems to have held, nor a subject, as Mr. Bradley holds, but rather, as Leibniz believed, a relation between subject and predicate. For a content to be, it must be compossible, *i. e.*, coexistent with other contents. And here, again, we see the significance of the same word 'is' being used as an affirmative copula and as a symbol of existence.

In conclusion, we may state that between the universe of real existence and the universe of mere subsistence there intervene a number of systems, membership in which confers a relative existence. For example, some one may have dreamed of a present king of France or written a romance in which he figured, and in such systems the terms may sustain to one another such relations as their authors may choose, without any limitations whatever. Affirmative judgments expressing such relations will always be false, except when accompanied by the statement of the unreality of the system to which they are referred.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Tertulliano e la filosofia pagana. G. BONFIGLIOLI. *Revista Filosofica*, May-June, 1905. Pp. 356-376.

La Psicologia di Tertulliano nei suoi rapporti colla psicologia Stoica. G. BONFIGLIOLI. *Revista Filosofica*, September-October, 1905. Pp. 467-493.

The writer's purpose is to do belated justice to Tertullian. He begins his second article with a clear statement of his thesis. "Tertullian . . . when better studied in detail reveals himself as not deserving the common judgment which confounds his name with the multitude of Christians of the early centuries who hated and denounced the pagan world without discussing it. In treating of his general argument I sought to show that notwithstanding the anathemas launched against the philosophers of antiquity, notwithstanding his contempt for ancient wisdom, Tertullian was, nevertheless, unable to evade the influence of philosophical theories, and that in particular he imitated the Stoics. But it is in his psychology that his dependence on the Stoic school is most evident, since it was in the materialism of this school that Tertullian found the most effective means of opposing what he regarded as the common basis of the Gnostic doctrines, the hated Platonic theory."

To be sure, Tertullian regarded 'philosophy' as the work of the devil, as the parent of all heresy, as prepared solely for the glorification of its human inventors, and he exults in the prospect of seeing the philosophers burn in hell fire. But we may ask: To whom is the term 'philosopher' applied, and what is the ground of so much bitterness?

Philosopher and heretic are equivalent terms for Tertullian, and the 'heretics' are the Gnostics, who had undertaken to inject elements derived from pagan philosophy into the Christian doctrine. And since the Gnostics made use chiefly of the Platonic tradition, it is natural that Tertullian should feel toward this an especial animosity. He would destroy Plato in order to demolish the philosophical arguments which supported the Gnostic heresies. Wherever Tertullian breaks into one of his fiery invectives against Greek philosophy, he is pretty sure to use some epithet which shows that he has in mind the sect hostile to the traditional church. Aristotle, too, is denounced, since from him the Gnostics get the concept of matter, and the Stoics offend in daring to attribute matter to the divine substance.

Yet in spite of the fact that the philosophers of ancient Greece were without the revelation of Christ, and therefore knew not God, Tertullian makes abundant use of their opinions in so far as these help him to attack the Gnostics. For Tertullian was a learned man, familiar with pagan literature and acquainted with Greek philosophy; and the study of law, to which he seems to have early devoted himself, must have helped him to appreciate the practical spirit of the ancient thinkers. His reflective attitude appears in his respect for 'nature.' "Nature is our first school; whatever is contrary to nature is monstrous." And "All that is born is of God; all that is invented (*fingitur*) is of the devil." In spite of corruption, a part of that nature which was like God has been preserved. This is reason. God is its guide and master. When the ancient thinkers follow the guide of reason, then their thoughts do not merit derision; for the soul will instinctively declare the truth. In this way Tertullian shifts his position so as to be able to appeal, on occasion, to the philosophers. Numerous citations from the physicians show how he had looked for psychological evidence in harmony with his own doctrines, and even from Plato and Aristotle something is taken.

But it was in the Stoic materialism and sensationalism that Tertullian found the best weapons with which to combat the Platonic immaterialism. "*Paene nobiscum sunt*," he wrote, thinking of the Stoics. Bonfiglioli thinks the sentence would be more sincere without '*paene*,' and he quotes with approval the following from Havet ('*Le christianisme et ses origines*'): "Tertullian, instead of saying 'Seneca belonged to us,' ought to have said 'It is from Seneca that I and my own masters have received the greater part of our doctrine, and it is to him and to other philosophers of the Stoic school, more than to the sacred books that we owe our theory of the spiritual life.'"

Accordingly, whatever is, is body: "*Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis*"; "*Nihil est incorporale nisi quod non est*"; "*Nihil enim Anima*

si non corpus"; "*Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie*"; and all '*substantia*' must be '*corpus*.' *Substantia* is for Tertullian precisely equivalent to *ὑποκείμενον* in the Stoic usage, the material substrate which nearly coincides with their highest concept '*τί*.' In the writings of Tertullian the same relation exists between *substantia* and *res*.

Not only is the divine nature corporeal; so is the word, the *λόγος*. They must be corporeal, since in the Stoic doctrine, adopted by Tertullian, only corporeal things can act upon other things and be effected by other things. According to Diogenes, *πάν γὰρ τὸ ποιῶν σῶμά ἐστιν* and Sextus Empiricus defines *σῶμα* as *ὃ οὐδὲν τε ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν*, and Cicero: "*Nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus*." Also Tertullian's idea of *corpus* is identical with the Stoic notion of *σῶμα*. Even such things as virtue and vice, true and good, anger and love, friendship and hate, are corporeal; they are cases of tension (*τόνος*) of the pneumatic soul substance (*πνεῦμα*).

Tertullian is most concerned to prove that the soul is a body, and resorts to many ingenious arguments. Since the soul is derived from God, and is '*deo propinquus*,' '*deo proximo*,' it is corporeal like the divine substance, and also because it can act and be acted upon. Again, since, in the Stoic doctrine, the arts are corporeal and the soul nourishes itself by them, the soul must be of the same nature. The soul, although derived from God, is differentiated from God. The soul is *flatus*, God is *spiritus*. The soul is not, as the Gnostics said, a part of God. On the other hand, the soul is as intimately related to man. The body of the flesh and the pneumatic body make up together what is called man. The pneumatic body is in many respects a duplicate of the carnal body; it has a definite sex. In the act of generation the soul reproduces itself and the body reproduces itself. It reaches sexual maturity when the body does. It differs from the carnal body '*tenuitate sola vel subtilitate*,' and it has the color suitable to such subtile corporeality, *viz.*, the blue of the heavens. That this pneumatic body does not reveal itself to the carnal eye is no proof that it does not exist. It does not follow that it is invisible to God and the saints. In addition to the above-mentioned arguments for the corporeality of the soul, Tertullian appeals to the sacred writings wherein there is mention of pains in hell and joys in heaven. But only a body is capable of these. Nor was there lack of direct human testimony. A prophetess of the Montanist sect had declared that while in an ecstasy she had beheld the Savior, the angels, the souls of the dead; these were soft to the touch, transparent, of a bluish color, and similar in form to our own bodies. Tertullian appeals also to various empirical demonstrations drawn from the physicians and naturalists.

Tertullian was at pains to demonstrate the unity and simplicity of the soul, being anxious to combat the doctrine of Valentinus that in the first man the soul was indeed of a single uniform type, but that in the course of time it had become multiform. In this mood Tertullian identifies *anima*, *animus* and *spiritus*, regarding them as different aspects or determinations of the one original substance.

Nevertheless Tertullian admits the division of the soul into *rationalis* and *irrationalis*. The distinction is not so sharp, however, as the λογιστικόν and the ἄλογον of Plato. Tertullian affirms that the soul, being from God, is rational by nature, and the property of irrationality is a corruption accomplished by the devil. And within the soul there is a dominant factor, a ἡγεμονικόν, having its seat in the heart. On the whole, however, "*huiusmodi autem non tam partes animae habebantur quam vires et efficaciae et operationes . . . non enim sunt substantiae animalis, sed ingenia, etc.*," each of which corresponds to a πῶς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν.

In his theory of dreams and in his theory of the intuitive power of the soul, Tertullian closely follows the Stoics. The soul, being immortal, can never cease from activity; it neither needs repose nor could possibly take it. Sleep, far from hindering the spontaneity of the soul, leaves it free, just as *ὑπνος* was defined by Diogenes as the liberation of the soul from the service of the senses. Tertullian explains that during sleep the soul in the fullness of its liberty displays its full activity in dreams, which are states of ecstasy in which the gift of divination ('*periculi aut gaudii augurem*') is enjoyed. In combating Hermogenes, Tertullian is willing to cite even Plato in order to prove the '*divinitas animae quae in praesagio erumpit*.'

The articles are provided with abundant references to the texts. Whoever should look them all up ought to find himself thoroughly *orientiert*.

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Hirnphysiologie und Willenstheorien. PAUL FLECHSIG. *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*, Bd. 4, Heft 4, 1905. S. 475-498.

By way of introduction to his discussion of the relation of body and mind, the author points out certain important stages in the progress of brain physiology. Constantin Varoli's belief that 'the mind of the animal resides in the substance of the brain' served as a stimulus toward efforts to localize brain functions. But the work of several generations of physiologists, whose chief contributions to their science were improvements of method, was completed before brain physiology really began to make progress. In the last third of the nineteenth century the silver method of Golgi and Cajal revealed structural facts which made possible the development of the present tendencies of neurology.

Pathology and embryology, especially the process of myelogenesis, and experiments with animals, have made numerous and invaluable contributions to our knowledge of the anatomy of the nervous system, its growth and significance. Comparative studies of the structure and functions of the nervous system have revealed facts concerning the brain cortex which render our knowledge of the relations of the various parts of the brain fairly satisfactory. These comparative studies uniformly indicate a parallelism between the structure of the nervous system and mental processes. Forms of mind, the author states, vary regularly with forms of brain. Although our knowledge of the details of this parallelism is incomplete,